Safeguarding aid workers
Safeguarding, protection and security management are three systems with three vocabularies covering much of the same ground. Where they are kept apart, the gaps between them are where staff fall.
The three systems
| System | Protects | Typical owner |
|---|---|---|
| Safeguarding | People the organisation serves, and anyone who comes into contact with its programmes, from harm caused by its own staff and representatives | Programmes, compliance or a dedicated safeguarding lead |
| Protection | Affected populations, from the conduct of parties to the conflict and from the effects of the conflict itself | Programmes, protection specialists |
| Security risk management | Staff, assets and programmes, from the hazards of the environment | Security or operations |
The boundaries are not as clean as the table suggests. When a member of staff is subjected to sexual violence by a colleague, that is a safeguarding failure and a security incident. When a member of staff is subjected to it by an armed actor, it is a security incident with a protection dimension. When a member of the community served is harmed by a member of staff, it is a safeguarding failure that may also become a security incident, because the organisation's acceptance in that community has just changed.
Why the separation causes harm
- Two reporting routes, one incident. A person who has been harmed has to decide which system they are reporting into before they can report. That decision is the organisation's to make, not theirs.
- Two sets of records. The same incident appears in the security log and in the safeguarding log with different details, and the analysis of neither is complete.
- Two responses. The security function moves the person; the safeguarding function opens a case. Neither talks to the other, and the person experiences both.
- Confidentiality that conflicts. Security incident reporting is often organisation-wide by design. Safeguarding records are restricted by design. Running both on one incident produces a disclosure problem.
What a single framework looks like
The guidance does not propose merging the systems. It proposes three things that remove the gaps without dissolving the distinction. A single entry point where a person can report harm without first categorising it, with the organisation deciding internally which system takes the lead. A shared classification so that one incident produces one record, copied to both logs, with a single restricted version holding the personal detail. And a joint review after any incident involving both, so that the security consequence and the safeguarding consequence are examined together.
It also makes a point about scope that organisations frequently miss. Safeguarding is usually written as a duty toward the people served, and the staff who deliver the programme are treated as the subjects of it rather than as people entitled to its protection. Staff, partners, volunteers, drivers and guards are all exposed to harm from people inside the organisation, and they are all entitled to the same standard.
Related
Practical guidance and research on the security of humanitarian staff, for the organisations that send them.